Defections without Consequences? Rethinking the Legal Gaps in Nigeria’s Executive Political Migration

Political defections have become a recurring and controversial feature of Nigeria’s democratic landscape, particularly among executive office holders such as governors and the president. While party-switching is not inherently unconstitutional, the Nigerian legal framework appears to tolerate executive defections without imposing tangible consequences, unlike the legislative branch where limited checks exist under Sections 68 and 109 of the 1999 Constitution. This paper critically examines the legal, institutional, and judicial gaps that have allowed these defections to go largely unpunished, undermining political stability, public trust, and democratic accountability. Drawing on doctrinal analysis, recent case studies from 2015 to 2025, and comparative insights from India and South Africa, the paper reveals that Nigeria’s constitutional silence on executive defection has emboldened opportunistic political migration. It argues for urgent legal reform to safeguard political integrity and suggests targeted constitutional amendments and statutory provisions that could introduce deterrents and ensure accountability among executive defectors.

Introduction

Political defection, often referred to as “party switching” or “cross-carpeting,” has become an entrenched feature of Nigeria’s democratic practice since the country returned to civilian rule in 1999. Although political migration occurs in many multiparty democracies, its prevalence and normalization in Nigeria have generated widespread concern about the sanctity of the democratic mandate, the role of political parties, and the integrity of the electoral system (Omotola, 2010). While defections are common among legislators, the phenomenon has gained renewed attention due to its increasing occurrence among elected executives such as governors, deputy governors, and even presidential aspirants without accompanying legal, political, or electoral consequences. This raises serious questions about the legal frameworks that permit such political fluidity and the implications for accountability and representative governance.

The Nigerian Constitution (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999), as amended, contains specific provisions aimed at curbing political defections by lawmakers. Section 68(1)(g) and its state-level equivalent, Section 109(1)(g), stipulate that a legislator who defects from the political party under which they were elected must vacate their seat, except in cases where the defection results from a division within the party or a merger with another party (Ehirimet al., 2025). These provisions reflect the constitutional drafters’ intent to tether political office to party ideology and maintain electoral integrity. However, conspicuously absent from the constitutional text are corresponding provisions applicable to executive office holders namely, the President, Vice President, Governors, and Deputy Governors. As a result, executives have exploited this lacuna to defect with impunity, often triggering political instability and undermining the electorate’s expectations.

This legal silence has become especially problematic in the past decade, with several high-profile cases illustrating how executives use defection as a political strategy to retain or consolidate power. Governors such as Aminu Tambuwal (Sokoto), David Umahi (Ebonyi), Bello Matawalle (Zamfara), Ben Ayade (Cross River), Sheriff Oborevwori (Delta), Umo Bassey Eno (Akwa Ibom) all switched party allegiance during their tenures between 2015 and 2025. In none of these cases were they subjected to legal sanction, removed from office, or required to seek a fresh mandate from the electorate. Courts, too, have been consistent in their interpretation of the constitutional silence as a barrier to imposing any form of disqualification or punitive consequence. In the landmark case of Attorney-General of the Federation v. Atiku Abubakar (2007), the Supreme Court held that the Vice President’s defection to another party did not amount to “gross misconduct” under Section 143 and could not be a basis for removal from office unless through constitutionally prescribed impeachment procedures. While the decision respected the rule of law and constitutional separation of powers, it also highlighted the judiciary’s hands-off approach to filling normative gaps in the constitutional order.

The consequence of this judicial restraint and constitutional lacuna is the institutionalization of what Nuhu (2021) terms as “executive impunity” a situation in which those who occupy the highest elective offices in the land are able to change political allegiance mid-tenure without facing any repercussions. This undermines both the democratic principle of popular sovereignty and the integrity of the party system, which is supposed to serve as a platform for coherent policy-making and ideological representation. In Nigeria, political parties are often ideologically indistinct and structurally weak, a condition that facilitates frequent defections based on personal ambition or strategic advantage rather than principled disagreement (Nwoko & Nweke, 2023).

Comparative experience demonstrates that it is both possible and beneficial to constitutionally regulate political defections, including those involving the executive. For example, India’s Tenth Schedule, added to its Constitution by the 52nd Amendment in 1985, disqualifies any legislator or elected official who defects from the party on whose platform they were elected (Rana & Srrivastava, 2024). The law was upheld in the landmark decision of Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu, AIR (1993), where the Supreme Court of India ruled that party allegiance is integral to the democratic process and that elected officials must not be allowed to subvert the will of the electorate. South Africa offers another instructive example: after experimenting with floor-crossing laws, which allowed for mid-term party switching, the South African Parliament reversed course by passing constitutional amendments in 2008 that outlawed the practice due to its destabilizing effects (Republic of South Africa, 2008).

Despite these international examples, Nigeria continues to operate within a legal vacuum that enables executive political migration. The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), which has a constitutional mandate to oversee electoral processes, has often argued that it lacks the legal authority to act against executive defectors unless so directed by a court. Meanwhile, political parties themselves have become complicit in the normalization of defection. Rather than sanctioning defectors, parties often welcome them with fanfare, especially when the defection offers electoral advantage (Agboga, 2024). This has led to a transactional political culture devoid of ideological commitments and has significantly weakened institutional democracy.

This paper aims to fill an important gap in the literature by focusing specifically on executive political defections and the legal vacuum that currently permits them. While considerable research has been paid to legislative defections, relatively little scholarly work has interrogated the unique challenges posed by defections within the executive branch. The consequences of this phenomenon are far-reaching. They include the erosion of voter trust, disruption of governance, distortion of political competition, and misalignment between electoral mandates and policy implementation.

The objectives of this study are fourfold. First, to analyse the constitutional and legal framework governing defections in Nigeria and identify the legal silences that permit executive political migration. Second, to examine judicial interpretations and institutional responses to executive defections from 2015 to 2025. Third, to compare Nigeria’s legal regime with those of other jurisdictions that have adopted more stringent anti-defection measures. Finally, to propose actionable legal and policy reforms that can address the existing gaps while balancing the right to freedom of association with the need for electoral accountability.

Method

This study adopts a doctrinal legal research methodology, focusing on the critical examination of primary and secondary legal sources. Primary sources include the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended), relevant Supreme Court and Court of Appeal decisions, and statutory provisions such as the Electoral Act 2022 (2022). Judicial pronouncements that have interpreted or affected the understanding of political defections, such as Attorney-General of the Federation v. Atiku Abubakar (2007) and Eze & Ors. v. Governor of Abia State & Ors. (2010) are analysed for their legal reasoning and implications.

To broaden the scope of analysis, the paper employs a comparative legal approach by examining anti-defection frameworks in India and South Africa. These jurisdictions are selected due to their common law heritage, multiparty political systems, and experience in managing party defections through explicit constitutional or legislative instruments. This comparative lens allows for normative benchmarking and offers reform models that Nigeria might adapt.

The research also incorporates case study analysis of recent instances of executive defection between 2015 and 2025. These include defections by governors in Ebonyi, Zamfara, and Cross River States, Delta, Akwa Ibom as well as the 2022 defection of the then-ruling party presidential candidate. These case studies are used to assess the practical consequences (or lack thereof) of such political migrations and their legal treatment by Nigerian courts and political institutions.

Secondary sources used include peer-reviewed journal articles, law commission reports, books, and media reports. These help contextualize the normative, theoretical, and political underpinnings of party-switching and the democratic principles at stake.

The methodology, though doctrinal, remains policy-focused, as it not only dissects the existing legal framework but also makes prescriptive recommendations. It asks normative questions about what the law ought to be in order to preserve electoral integrity and democratic accountability in Nigeria’s political system.

Results

Constitutional Provisions and the Legal Silence on Executive Defections

The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) is unambiguous in regulating defections among members of the National Assembly and State Houses of Assembly. Sections 68(1)(g) and 109(1)(g) provide that legislators who defect from the political party on whose platform they were elected must vacate their seats unless the defection is occasioned by a division within the party or a merger with another party. These sections have been interpreted by Nigerian courts in cases such as Ifedayo Abegunde v. The Ondo State House of Assembly & Ors (2015) to uphold the principle that political representation is tied to party affiliation, and by extension, to the electorate’s mandate.

However, the Constitution is conspicuously silent on elected members of the executive branch namely the President, Vice President, Governors, and Deputy Governors. No provision exists that penalizes executive office holders for defecting to another party after election. This omission has created a significant legal lacuna that emboldens executive defections without consequences. This legal silence was addressed in Attorney-General of the Federation v. Atiku Abubakar (2007), where the Supreme Court held that while the act of defection by the Vice President may be politically inappropriate, there was no constitutional basis to compel his resignation or disqualify him from office. The Court affirmed that, in the absence of specific constitutional provisions, no legal sanction could be applied to such executive defections.

The judicial pronouncements reveals a key constitutional gap: while legislative defections are regulated and penalized, executive defections are not addressed, thereby creating a distinct category of political officeholders who may change party affiliation without legal consequence. This finding highlights an asymmetry in the constitutional treatment of defections across different arms of elected government in Nigeria.

Notable Executive Defections (2015–2025): Patterns and Impact

The past decade has seen a marked escalation in defections by members of the executive branch in Nigeria, particularly in the period leading up to general elections. These defections have often been driven by factors such as political survival, alignment with the ruling party at the federal level, access to state resources, or dissatisfaction with internal party structures. The following cases illustrate this trend:

a) Governor Aminu Tambuwal (Sokoto State): Elected under the All Progressives Congress (APC) in 2015, Tambuwal defected to the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) in 2018, just months before the 2019 elections. No legal challenge resulted in his removal or disqualification. He completed his term and contested for re-election.

b) Governor David Umahi (Ebonyi State): Umahi defected from the PDP to the APC in November 2020. His defection was challenged in PDP v. Umahi & Ors (2022), where a Federal High Court declared his seat vacant. However, the Court of Appeal later overruled this decision, stating that the Constitution did not mandate the removal of governors upon defection.

c) Governor Bello Matawalle (Zamfara State): Matawalle was elected under the PDP in 2019 and defected to the APC in 2021. Like Umahi, his defection was widely criticized but not punished. The PDP filed legal proceedings, but courts refused to declare his seat vacant, citing the absence of constitutional grounds.

d) Governor Ben Ayade (Cross River State): Ayade defected from the PDP to the APC in 2021 without consequence. His deputy followed suit. Like others, Ayade completed his term with full benefits and later contested for a senatorial position.

e) Presidential Candidate Defections: In the run-up to the 2023 elections, several prominent candidates some of whom previously served in executive capacities—crossed party lines, including former governors and ministers. This trend reinforced the perception that Nigerian political actors are ideologically fluid, driven more by expediency than by principle.

f) Governor Sheriff Oborevwori (Delta State): Elected under the PDP in 2023, Oborevwori officially joined the APC in April 2025. In a high-profile ceremony dubbed “not defection but a movement,” he explained the move was necessary to “get the best for the state,” citing consultations with stakeholders and a desire to align with President Tinubu’s agenda (Egobiambu, 2025).

g) Governor Umo Bassey Eno (Akwa Ibom State): Also elected under the PDP in 2023, Eno defected to the APC in June 2025. He stated the decision was made to support President Tinubu’s reforms, enhance inclusivity, and bring “value to the APC in Akwa Ibom,” urging cohesion and loyalty from his administration (Yafugborhiet al., 2025).

These instances reflect a clear and consistent pattern: executive political defections occur without legal or political cost. Courts have remained reluctant to intervene in the absence of specific constitutional sanctions, and political parties often accept defectors without objection, particularly when electoral gains are anticipated. As shown in Table I below, each of these high-profile defections between 2015 and 2025 attracted no legal sanctions, with judicial responses largely constrained by constitutional silence and political parties embracing defectors rather than punishing them. As a result, defections by executive officials have become normalized within the Nigerian political process.

Table I. Notable Executive Defections in Nigeria (2015–2025) and Institutional Response

Name of officeholder	State/Position	Year of defection	From party → To party	Legal consequence	Judicial action	INEC or party response
Aminu Tambuwal	Governor, Sokoto	2018	APC → PDP	None	None	PDP welcomed
David Umahi	Governor, Ebonyi	2020	PDP → APC	None	FHC ruled removal; overturned on appeal	None
Bello Matawalle	Governor, Zamfara	2021	PDP → APC	None	No disqualification	APC welcomed
Ben Ayade	Governor, Cross River	2021	PDP → APC	None	None	Grand reception
Sheriff Oborevwori	Governor, Delta	2025	PDP → APC	None	None	“Not defection but movement” narrative
Umo Bassey Eno	Governor, Akwa Ibom	2025	PDP → APC	None	None	Party integration

Judicial Interpretation and Deference to Constitutional Silence

Nigerian courts have consistently acknowledged the problematic nature of political defections by elected officials. However, in the absence of express constitutional or legislative provisions, the judiciary has exhibited restraint, adhering strictly to the doctrine of constitutional fidelity. Two notable cases illustrate this judicial position:

a) Attorney-General of the Federation v. Atiku Abubakar (2007): The Supreme Court held that the President and Vice President derive their mandate from the electorate rather than the political party under which they contested. As such, the defection of a Vice President could not be considered a ground for removal unless it constituted “gross misconduct” under Section 143 of the Constitution, a threshold that must be determined through an impeachment process initiated by the National Assembly.

b) PDP v. Umahi & Ors (2022): The Federal High Court initially ruled that the votes secured in an election belonged to the political party, and therefore, the defection of Governor Umahi warranted the loss of his office. However, the Court of Appeal reversed the decision, finding no constitutional basis for the removal of a governor on the grounds of defection. The Supreme Court subsequently upheld the appellate decision, reinforcing the position that defections by executive officeholders are not constitutionally prohibited or punishable.

These decisions reflect a consistent judicial approach: while courts have expressed disapproval of defections on moral or ethical grounds, they remain bound by the text of the Constitution. In the absence of explicit provisions authorizing sanctions against executive defections, the judiciary has declined to intervene, thereby reinforcing the existing constitutional silence.

Institutional Responses: INEC and Political Parties

The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), as Nigeria’s electoral body, has consistently declined to take any direct action against elected executive officials who defect from one political party to another during their tenure. INEC has maintained that it lacks the constitutional authority to disqualify or remove an executive officeholder for defection in the absence of a judicial pronouncement. Consequently, in all the cases reviewed during this study including defections by Governors Umahi, Matawalle, Ayade, and others, INEC did not initiate any proceedings or sanctions.

Political parties have also played a significant role in shaping the response to executive defections. In practice, parties often receive defecting governors and their supporters without internal disciplinary measures or procedural resistance. Public receptions and “welcome rallies” have become a common feature following defections, indicating an institutional culture of acceptance. Defecting governors are often given prominent roles within their new parties, and in some instances, re-nominated for elective offices under their new platforms.

The pattern of institutional non-responsiveness by INEC and the accommodating posture of political parties reflect a permissive environment surrounding executive defections. These responses contribute to the entrenchment of defections as an established political practice, with no legal or institutional deterrents identified within the framework of this study.

Comparative Practice: India and South Africa

a) India: The Tenth Schedule of the Indian Constitution, introduced in 1985 through the anti-defection law, provides that any elected member including those in the executive shall be disqualified from holding office if they voluntarily relinquish membership of the party on whose platform they were elected (Guruvayurappan, 2023). India’s Supreme Court in Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu, AIR (1993), upheld the validity of this schedule, affirming the power of the Speaker to disqualify defectors.

b) South Africa: The South African Constitution (Republic of South Africa, 2008) originally included provisions barring floor-crossing by members of Parliament and provincial legislatures (Issacharoff, 2013). In 2002 and 2003, legislation temporarily allowed floor-crossing subject to conditions such as a minimum tenth-share of the party caucus and set time windows (Smiles, 2011). However, widespread misuse and public backlash led to the repeal of this regime through the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Constitutional Amendment Acts in 2008, which fully abolished floor-crossing in national, provincial, and local government from April 2009 (Khosla & Vaishnav, 2024).

These comparative examples demonstrate that other constitutional systems have instituted clear institutional barriers to prevent opportunistic defections, including among executive officeholders. They provide relevant benchmarks for potential legal reforms aimed at addressing Nigeria’s current constitutional silence on executive defections.

Discussion

The findings of this study illuminate a profound and enduring flaw in Nigeria’s constitutional and legal framework one that enables, and arguably legitimizes, unregulated political defections by executive officeholders. This legal and institutional permissiveness not only erodes the sanctity of the electoral mandate but destabilizes core democratic norms such as accountability, transparency, and ideological fidelity. By failing to construct effective constitutional safeguards, the Nigerian system inadvertently entrenches a culture of opportunism and weakens the moral foundations of governance.

Constitutionalism and the Crisis of Legal Gaps

At the core of Nigeria’s permissive regime on executive defections lies an intentional or negligent constitutional silence. Sections 68 and 109 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) explicitly prescribe consequences for legislative defections, requiring members of the National and State Assemblies to vacate their seats unless certain narrowly defined conditions are met. However, this accountability framework pointedly omits executive officeholders such as Governors, Deputy Governors, the President, and the Vice President. The result is a doctrinal inconsistency and a normative failure: two sets of rules for two categories of elected officials, despite their equal dependence on the people’s mandate.

This asymmetry in constitutional regulation undermines the principle of equal accountability across governmental tiers. It privileges executives with immunity from political consequence, granting them unchecked freedom to shift allegiances mid-term, regardless of the voters’ will. As Nwabueze (2003) insightfully argues, constitutionalism is not merely about having a written constitution, but about the imposition of legal restraints on the exercise of public power. Where elected leaders exercise that power without legal restraint such as through unregulated defections the legitimacy of the entire democratic project is jeopardized.

Moreover, this gap challenges the foundational idea of representative democracy. In theory, elections are not mere popularity contests but instruments of political delegation. The electorate confers its sovereign will on a candidate within a party platform, expecting continuity and ideological alignment. When an executive defects mid-term often for self-preservation, opportunistic advantage, or political bargaining, it constitutes a unilateral breach of this democratic contract. The absence of any constitutional requirement for consultation, referendum, or re-election in such circumstances strips the electorate of its right to reassess its mandate.

This practice directly undermines the doctrine of consent, a central feature of democratic theory. Political theorists from Locke to Rawls have emphasized that legitimate authority stems from the sustained consent of the governed (Masandiko & Monchena, 2024; Tuckness, 2024). Where executives change party affiliation mid-stream without returning to the electorate, they circumvent this principle and operate on what is, in effect, a usurped mandate.

Even more concerning is the normalization of this breach. Executive defections are no longer treated as aberrations but as tactical routines within Nigeria’s political chessboard. This routinization suggests a deeper structural malaise namely, that the Nigerian constitutional order lacks the normative ambition to defend political integrity where it matters most: at the apex of state power.

Judicial Passivity and the Limits of Interpretation

A central paradox emerging from Nigeria’s experience with executive defections is the judiciary’s principled acknowledgment of the problem yet persistent unwillingness to act decisively. The courts have repeatedly lamented the destabilizing impact of unregulated defections, yet they have cloaked their restraint in constitutional fidelity. This judicial posture, though textually defensible, reveals a deeper crisis in the philosophy of constitutional adjudication in Nigeria, which is off course the refusal to interpret silence as a constitutional deficiency requiring normative correction.

The landmark case of Attorney-General of the Federation v. Atiku Abubakar (2007) encapsulates this dilemma. Faced with the question of whether a Vice President’s defection amounted to gross misconduct warranting removal, the Supreme Court held that defection alone was not constitutionally actionable unless framed within Section 143’s impeachment procedure. The ruling essentially insulated executive defectors from legal sanction unless they committed an impeachable offense thereby excluding political betrayal from the definition of constitutional delinquency. This decision, while legally cautious, ignores the broader normative function of the judiciary in protecting the integrity of democratic mandates.

Similarly, in PDP v. Umahi & Ors (2022), the Federal High Court initially declared that the votes belonged to the political party, and thus the governor’s defection invalidated his mandate. Yet the appellate courts, culminating in the Supreme Court, reversed this decision. They reasoned that in the absence of explicit constitutional provisions, they lacked jurisdiction to remove a sitting governor for crossing party lines. Again, the judiciary adhered to a strict textualist philosophy, eschewing a purposive reading that might allow courts to intervene where political morality and electoral justice are at stake.

This approach reflects a jurisprudence deeply entrenched in legal positivism, which is the notion that law must be enforced as written, regardless of perceived injustice or gaps (Green & Adams, 2019). While positivism ensures judicial restraint and protects against judicial overreach, it can also foster legal stagnation, especially in societies grappling with democratic fragility. As scholars like Tushnet (1993) and Dworkin (1996) have argued, constitutional adjudication cannot be reduced to grammatical parsing; it must engage with underlying principles of justice, accountability, and good governance.

Comparative constitutional courts have not hesitated to adopt such purposive approaches. The Indian Supreme Court, for instance, has creatively interpreted the anti-defection law to reinforce party discipline and democratic integrity, sometimes reading into constitutional provisions implied limitations or obligations. In Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu, AIR (1993), the Indian judiciary upheld the Speaker’s power to disqualify defectors as essential for maintaining the credibility of parliamentary democracy. In Kenya, the courts have intervened to invalidate party-switching that distorts the electoral will, recognizing that judicial restraint must give way to democratic necessity (Stacey & Miyandazi, 2021).

Nigeria’s courts, by contrast, have treated the Constitution as a closed book. Their refusal to infer implied limitations or create democratic doctrines such as the accountability of elected officials to their political platforms represents a missed opportunity to build a transformative jurisprudence responsive to Nigeria’s democratic realities. Indeed, by remaining inert in the face of repeated executive defections, the judiciary has arguably become complicit in the erosion of voter sovereignty.

The doctrine of the separation of powers does not demand judicial paralysis (Aloamaka & Kore-Okiti, 2023). Rather, it calls for a balance: while courts must avoid legislating from the bench, they also bear the responsibility of ensuring that the constitutional order evolves in service of democratic consolidation. Silence in the Constitution should not always be read as permission; in certain contexts, it may represent oversight or underdevelopment requiring judicial elaboration. As Nwabuoku & Gasiokwu (2022) have noted, doing justice often requires courts to move beyond rigid legal formalism toward equity-based interpretations that promote substantial justice and protect democratic integrity.

In the final analysis, judicial passivity has entrenched a status quo where executive defection is not just lawful, but unchallengeable. Without a shift toward a more purposive, principle-driven interpretation of the Constitution, one that privileges democratic values over textual austerity, the courts risk forfeiting their role as guardians of constitutional morality. As Nigeria’s democratic experiment matures, the judiciary must rise beyond procedural conservatism and embrace a more substantive role in defending the sanctity of the people’s mandate.

Political Complicity and Institutional Failure

Beyond the judiciary, other democratic institutions particularly INEC and political parties have abdicated their roles in curbing executive defections. INEC’s claim that it lacks the power to disqualify defectors unless ordered by the courts reflects a narrow interpretation of its mandate. While it is true that INEC cannot act ultra vires the Constitution, it arguably has a duty under Section 153 and the Electoral Act (2022) to protect the integrity of elections, which includes preventing the manipulation of the electoral mandate (Awhefeadaet al., 2023).

Political parties, which should serve as gatekeepers of ideological consistency and discipline, have become complicit in promoting defections. The celebration of defectors through high-profile rallies signals a transactional political culture where ideology is secondary to electoral calculus. This has led to the rise of political nomadism, where political actors roam between parties without facing disapproval or sanction. The broader democratic crisis that tolerates executive defections is mirrored in the persistence of vote-buying, which, as Nwabuokuet al. (2023) observes, reflects a political culture where electoral victory is treated as a transaction rather than a public trust.

The lack of internal party democracy, weak disciplinary frameworks, and rent-seeking motivations within parties have all contributed to the normalization of defection. As Omotola (2010) observes, Nigeria’s party system is ideologically barren, and this makes defections appear rational even if they undermine the democratic order.

Beyond the constitutional silence and judicial restraint explored earlier, the entrenchment of executive defections in Nigeria is exacerbated by institutional complicity and political opportunism. Key democratic actors including the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), political parties, and legislative assemblies have either failed in their statutory responsibilities or have actively enabled a culture in which executive officials can switch party affiliations mid-tenure without legal, political, or moral consequence. This institutional weakness has fostered a permissive environment where the electoral mandate is treated as a negotiable commodity rather than a sacred trust.

INEC’s role in this crisis has been defined by a posture of reactive constitutionalism. The Commission often asserts that it lacks the authority to penalize defecting governors or presidents unless a judicial pronouncement is issued. While this interpretation may reflect institutional caution or fidelity to legal limits, it also reveals a troubling reluctance to engage proactively with its constitutional duty to safeguard electoral integrity. Section 153 of the Constitution empowers INEC as an independent body charged not only with conducting elections but also with upholding the integrity of the democratic process. When executive officeholders defect, especially under circumstances that subvert the voters’ expectations, INEC’s failure to even question such developments erodes public trust in the electoral system.

More critically, INEC’s silence reinforces the instrumentalization of elections. Elections are not only about casting ballots but about the legitimacy of the political choices citizens make. When the very institution tasked with protecting that choice refuses to act or even comment when those choices are undermined post-election, it sends a disheartening signal. In the cases of Governors Umahi, Ayade, and Matawalle, INEC remained silent and inert, neither initiating investigations nor issuing statements on the implications of such defections for democratic accountability. This passive stance reduces INEC to a mere logistics body organizing polls and announcing results rather than an institutional guarantor of democratic values.

Political parties, on the other hand, have been less passive and more explicitly complicit. In Nigeria, political parties have failed to develop or enforce mechanisms that promote ideological cohesion, discipline, or internal democracy (Musaet al., 2020). Rather than serving as custodians of the electoral contract and stewards of political integrity, parties have become enablers of opportunism. Governors and other executive officials who defect are not reprimanded or subjected to any disciplinary measures; instead, they are welcomed with celebration, strategic appointments, and promises of future political advancement (Nuhu, 2021). These orchestrated “welcome rallies” are more than symbolic as they legitimize betrayal of party principles and reinforce the message that political loyalty is irrelevant when weighed against access to power.

Compounding this problem is the failure of legislative oversight. In theory, the National Assembly and State Houses of Assembly are empowered to check the excesses of the executive, including through impeachment and investigative resolutions (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, ss. 88, 89, 128, 129, 143, & 188). In practice, however, these bodies have proven ineffective either because they are controlled by the governor’s political machinery or because they are politically compromised. Where legislatures are meant to function as sites of accountability and deliberation, they instead operate as echo chambers, rubber-stamping executive decisions or remaining silent in the face of democratic infractions (Ecomaet al., 2025). Even opposition-controlled assemblies have failed to hold defecting executives accountable, often due to internal disunity or inducements that neutralize resistance.

The implications of this institutional breakdown are far-reaching. First, it leads to a destabilization of governance. Executive defections are often accompanied by abrupt policy shifts, political reappointments, and reallocation of state resources to suit new partisan objectives. This undermines continuity in governance, weakens administrative memory, and disrupts long-term development planning. Second, it cultivates public cynicism and political apathy. When voters observe that their choices are repeatedly subverted by elite bargains, they lose faith in the electoral process. This disillusionment breeds disengagement and weakens civic participation which is the lifeblood of any functioning democracy.

Third, the normalization of executive defections contributes to a culture of political impunity. In the absence of legal sanctions, political costs, or institutional pushback, defection becomes an expected rite of passage in Nigeria’s electoral cycle. It emboldens future officeholders to prioritize personal or factional advantage over the electorate’s will, confident that no institution will call them to order. This cyclical erosion of democratic accountability poses a grave challenge to the consolidation of constitutional democracy in Nigeria.

Ultimately, restoring public faith in Nigeria’s democratic institutions requires a collective effort to reaffirm the principle that political power belongs to the people. Executive officials must be reminded by law, by party, and by institutional checks that their mandate is held in trust and that betrayal of that trust cannot go unpunished. Until this accountability mechanism is firmly embedded in Nigeria’s political culture, defections will continue to weaken democratic norms, undermine institutional legitimacy, and compromise the foundational ideals of representative government.

Democratic Consequences: Destabilization and Distrust

The most immediate and visible consequence of unregulated executive defections in Nigeria is the disruption of political stability and institutional coherence. When a governor or other executive official defects from the party under which they were elected, they often carry with them a significant portion of the political structure, loyal legislators, commissioners, special advisers, and other political appointees. This domino effect results in an overnight transformation of the political landscape, altering power dynamics within the legislature and the executive in ways that the electorate did not authorize. In states where political competition is tight, such a shift can produce a legitimacy crisis, with the defecting official now presiding over a government with a fundamentally altered political identity. The result is governance paralysis, fractured decision-making, and policy inconsistency.

Even more damaging, however, is the progressive erosion of public trust in Nigeria’s democratic institutions. Citizens who vote based on political manifestos, party ideologies, or specific campaign promises are betrayed when those elected abandon their platforms for personal or political expediency. Such mid-term shifts effectively render the electoral process meaningless, transforming elections into empty rituals rather than mechanisms of genuine democratic choice. As defections become normalized and repeated, cynicism and voter apathy grow, reducing electoral participation and weakening the legitimacy of the entire democratic process. The perception that politicians are self-serving and unaccountable diminishes citizens’ willingness to engage politically, which in turn undermines the sustainability of civic culture and democratic development.

Moreover, the strategic timing of executive defections typically in the months preceding general elections raises serious concerns about the abuse of incumbency and the misuse of state resources. When governors defect to the ruling party at the federal level, they often align state institutions, funding streams, and administrative machinery with their new political affiliations. This creates an asymmetrical electoral playing field in which opposition parties are disadvantaged by their lack of access to comparable state resources. The defecting governor may influence electoral commissions, security agencies, and the state media to favour their new party, thus subverting the principle of fair competition. Such maneuvers violate both the letter and spirit of democratic elections, which depend on equality of arms among contestants.

Furthermore, defections delegitimize opposition politics, especially in regions where the defector was previously elected under an opposition platform. By shifting allegiance to the ruling party, executive officials signal that political loyalty is fluid and transactional, often motivated by personal gain or fear of federal reprisal rather than principled dissent. This perception corrodes the function of opposition parties as critical checks on executive power, rendering them impotent and diminishing their capacity to hold government accountable. In the long run, the absence of a vibrant, ideologically grounded opposition stunts the growth of political pluralism and consolidates the dominance of hegemonic party structures—an outcome antithetical to healthy democratic competition.

Lessons from Comparative Jurisdictions

The global experience with political defections particularly in countries with similar democratic trajectories offers instructive insights for Nigeria’s ongoing constitutional malaise. Notably, India and South Africa have both encountered destabilizing waves of defections that threatened democratic legitimacy and governance continuity. However, unlike Nigeria, both countries responded with decisive institutional reforms, signalling a commitment to democratic consolidation over political expediency.

India’s approach to defections is perhaps the most legally structured. The insertion of the Tenth Schedule into the Indian Constitution in 1985 through the 52nd Amendment was a direct response to rampant party-switching that had begun to erode parliamentary stability (Roy, 2022). This anti-defection law applies uniformly to all elected officials including members of parliament, state legislatures, and executive appointees mandating automatic disqualification where a member voluntarily relinquishes the party that sponsored their election. As highlighted earlier, the Supreme Court of India in Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu, AIR (1993), upheld its constitutionality, affirming the authority of the Speaker to disqualify defectors. Though not without implementation challenges, particularly allegations of speaker bias—the Tenth Schedule has largely succeeded in restoring party discipline and electoral coherence. Most importantly, it codifies the principle that electoral mandates belong to parties, not individuals, and treats unauthorized defections as democratic theft (Khosla & Vaishnav, 2024).

South Africa’s experience provides an equally compelling narrative, albeit through a different trajectory. Initially, the 1996 Constitution permitted limited instances of “floor-crossing,” allowing elected officials to switch allegiance without losing their seats during designated windows. This was based on a pragmatic attempt to manage party fragmentation during the country’s transition from apartheid. However, the experiment backfired. Floor-crossing facilitated opportunism, weakened party coherence, and undermined voter trust. By 2008, the South African Parliament enacted the Constitution Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, effectively banning floor-crossing altogether for both national and provincial legislators. As Khosla & Vaishnav (2024) noted, the policy reversal was a recognition that stability and policy continuity outweigh the theoretical benefits of political fluidity, especially in contexts where democratic institutions are still maturing.

In both jurisdictions, the important lesson is that constitutional silence on defections is neither inevitable nor irreversible. Legislative innovation and constitutional reform are possible, even in polarized political environments. The contrast with Nigeria could not be starker. Despite repeated waves of executive defections that have upended governance and voter confidence, Nigeria has clung to constitutional inertia. The country’s refusal to amend its 1999 Constitution to address this democratic loophole suggests either a lack of political will or a cynical tolerance of opportunistic politics as a structural feature of the system. The result is a recurring cycle of electoral betrayal and political destabilization.

Critics of anti-defection laws often raise legitimate concerns. According to Gawade (2025), critics argue that overly rigid laws may stifle dissent, inhibit democratic debate within parties, and entrench authoritarian party leadership. These concerns are not unfounded, as seen in some Indian cases where dissenting members were disqualified for voting their conscience (Dubela & Sharma, 2023). However, such drawbacks are not insurmountable. Carefully tailored anti-defection frameworks can strike a balance between party discipline and individual expression. For instance, a law may require that any executive defection mid-term triggers a by-election or a vote of confidence in the legislature. Alternatively, a court-supervised process could assess the legitimacy of the defection, taking into account factors such as factional splits, party mergers, or ideological realignments.

Indeed, Nigeria’s Federal High Court and appellate courts have expressed discomfort with the current regime, but they remain bound by textual constraints. The Supreme Court’s position in Attorney-General of the Federation v. Atiku Abubakar (2007) and PDP v. Umahi & ors (2022) highlights the need for constitutional clarity. The judiciary cannot legislate from the bench. It falls upon the National Assembly, civil society, and democratic stakeholders to spearhead reform. A constitutional amendment that explicitly provides for “consequences” upon executive defection, including forfeiture of office or mandatory revalidation through re-election, would not only harmonize accountability across arms of government but also restore integrity to the electoral process.

Furthermore, the Indian and South African experiences show that constitutional experimentation does not preclude future refinement. Nigeria need not adopt a wholesale importation of the Tenth Schedule or the South African ban. Rather, it can develop a context-specific solution grounded in its own political culture, legal tradition, and governance realities. What is required is not rigidity, but principled regulation; a framework that affirms the sanctity of the electoral mandate while allowing room for legitimate political evolution.

Conclusion

Executive defections in Nigeria, enabled by constitutional silence, judicial restraint, and institutional complicity, have undermined democratic accountability and electoral integrity. Unlike legislators, governors and presidents can switch party allegiance without consequence, weakening public trust and distorting the mandate of the electorate. Comparative experiences from India and South Africa demonstrate that legal reform is both necessary and feasible. To restore the sanctity of democratic representation, Nigeria must amend its Constitution to include executive officeholders, empower institutions like INEC, and strengthen party discipline. Only through comprehensive legal and institutional reform can Nigeria safeguard its democracy from the corrosive effects of opportunistic political migration.

Recommendations

To ensure that Nigeria’s democracy is not further undermined by unchecked executive defections, this paper proposes the following reforms:

a) Constitutional Amendment to Cover Executive Defections: Sections 68 and 109 of the Constitution should be amended to include executive office holders, particularly the President, Vice President, Governors, and Deputy Governors. A new provision could be inserted to provide that if any executive office holder defects from the party under which they were elected (except where the party merges or is factionalized), their seat shall become vacant.

b) Mandate for Fresh Elections upon Defection: Any executive official who defects should be required to resign and recontest their position under their new party platform. This proposal preserves the democratic principle of ‘electoral consent’ and places the final decision in the hands of the electorate. India’s constitutional regime supports this model by prescribing disqualification as a deterrent.

c) Judicial Empowerment for Precedent-Setting Decisions: The Supreme Court and other appellate courts should develop a robust jurisprudence that interprets the constitutional silence on executive defections in a manner consistent with democratic norms and the integrity of the electoral process. Courts should not shy away from declaring that votes belong to parties in systems where elections are conducted on party platforms.

d) Empowerment of INEC to Act on Defections: The Electoral Act should be amended to give the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) authority to demand justification for mid-term defections and to petition courts for declaratory relief where such justification is absent. This would provide a semi-judicial route for accountability while preserving due process.

e) Internal Party Reforms: Political parties should adopt and enforce strict internal disciplinary measures to discourage defection. This includes denying defectors automatic tickets for new offices, removing them from party executive roles, and penalizing party officials who collude to facilitate defection for electoral gain.

Conflict of Interest

The authors declare that they do not have any conflict of interest.